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BOOK REVIEWS
WHY? AND OTHER THIRTY-FIVE-YEAR QUESTIONS
Pussycats: Why the Rest Keeps Beating the West and What Can Be Done about It, by Martin van  
Creveld� Mevasseret Zion, Isr�: DLVC Enterprises, 2016� 249 pages� $11�95�
Martin van Creveld is one of the 
foremost—and most controversial— 
contemporary students of warfare� He 
has authored over two dozen books 
exploring various facets of strategy, the 
future of warfare, and military opera-
tions and organization, including such 
works as The Rise and Decline of the 
State, The Transformation of War, Tech-
nology and War, Command in War, Sup-
plying War, and The Training of Officers�
In this book, van Creveld notes that, 
despite their overwhelming superiority 
in virtually every facet of military power, 
Western militaries since 1953 deployed 
abroad to fight non-Westerners almost 
always have been defeated and forced to 
withdraw� He poses the question, “How 
did the world’s best and most ferocious 
soldiers, who for centuries fought and 
defeated anybody and everybody until 
they dominated the entire world, turn 
into pussycats?” Van Creveld suggests 
five broad categories of causes that 
individually and collectively over 
time have eroded greatly the basis for 
effective Western military superiority:
• Subduing the young
• Defanging the troops
• Feminizing the forces 
• Constructing post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD)
• Delegitimizing war
The first refers to the ever-growing 
restrictions most Western countries have 
placed on young people, ostensibly on 
grounds of their safety and welfare� The 
author declares that “the move to impose 
more and more restrictions on young 
people is a manifestation, if not to say 
disease, typical of modern life in general 
and Western life in particular�” The entry 
into adulthood becomes ever more ex-
tended, reinforced by phenomena such 
as “helicopter parenting,” “safe spaces” 
and “trigger warnings” on campus, and 
strict limits on work that minors are 
permitted to do� This is complemented 
by an excessive emphasis on unearned 
“self-esteem,” a strong desire to avoid 
“traumatizing” the young by criticizing 
or reprimanding them, a de-emphasis 
on assuming individual responsibility, 
and the devaluation of competition 
for fear of hurting those who do not 
perform as well as others� The cumula-
tive effect, van Creveld argues, is to 
infantilize the young, undercut the 
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motivation to excel, and steadily reduce 
individual and societal willingness to 
take risks—thus, “scant wonder that 
a great many young people no longer 
know how to cope with anything�” Yet 
this is the pool from which Western 
militaries must draw their troops�
Van Creveld asserts that many factors 
have contributed to “defanging the 
troops�” He notes the vast increase since 
Vietnam in the proportion of senior 
officers in the U�S� military� This rank 
inflation has resulted in ever more deci-
sions being pushed to higher levels, with 
a seriously negative impact on the speed 
of decision making and a mounting risk 
aversion at all levels� Another problem 
is the spread of civilian attitudes into 
and imposition of civilian norms on the 
military� War is a deadly business, yet 
Western, especially U�S�, military forces 
have been hobbled by “exquisite” rules of 
engagement that often impede mission 
accomplishment at excessive risk to 
friendly forces� One side cannot play by 
“Marquess of Queensberry rules” alone� 
At the same time, there is a growing 
trend of senior officers “treating their 
troops as if they were rowdies and/or 
babies unable to look after themselves, 
and/or ‘pussycats�’” The recurrent bouts 
of drastic liberty restrictions on U�S� 
forces in Japan are a prime example� The 
author writes that “in today’s politically 
correct world it is no longer enough 
to kill those who would kill you”; the 
enemy must not be disrespected, let 
alone humiliated after his defeat—no 
battlefield souvenirs taken� Male ag-
gressiveness, historically quintessential 
to battlefield success, is now a problem 
for leadership to deal with, particularly 
with regard to matters such as pornog-
raphy and allegedly rampant sexual 
misconduct in the military, which have 
nothing to do with combat effectiveness� 
The proliferation of military lawyers on 
staffs means that commanders or squad 
leaders now must keep potential legal 
ramifications constantly in mind, on top 
of all the other battlefield imperatives�
But even worse, posits van Creveld, is 
the “de-Militarized Military�” While it is 
undeniable that “war is the most terrible 
of all activities we humans engage 
in,” there always has been a sense of 
satisfaction, even enjoyment, in it� But 
“in the prevailing attitude of political 
correctness [to proclaim that] invites at-
tack�” For example, when Marine general 
Jim Mattis noted that shooting some 
people who merited it was “a hell of a 
lot of fun,” he was roundly condemned 
and “counseled” to shut up� Similarly, 
the notions of “hero” and “heroism” that 
traditionally underpinned a military’s 
fighting spirit and its “culture of war” 
have been devalued systematically in 
Western societies as they pertain to 
combat, whereas they once were associ-
ated closely with pride� But the author 
warns that “any attempt to tamper with 
[the culture of war], even if laudable 
in terms of a progressive country’s 
instincts, is dangerous and should only 
be undertaken with the greatest caution� 
What has been demolished can never 
be restored�” Thus, he concludes, “scant 
wonder that � � � the willingness to 
serve has been declining for decades�”
Van Creveld’s third category, “feminiz-
ing the forces,” is no doubt the most 
controversial� He starts by stating flatly 
that “currently Western countries are 
embarked on a social experiment that 
has no precedent in history�” He further 
asserts that “whatever feminists may 
claim and the statute books may say, 
women and men are only equal in 
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certain respects but not in others� Hence 
the attempt to treat them as if they were 
was bound to cause as many problems as 
it solved�” There are two principal physi-
cal differences between the two sexes, 
namely, physical strength/endurance 
and pregnancy/motherhood� The author 
goes into some detail on how these 
impact individual and unit performance�
More importantly, van Creveld notes 
that the sustained, intensive effort to cre-
ate a “unisex” military has had serious 
second-order consequences� Measures 
such as putting men and women 
through separate courses with different 
physical performance requirements 
and “gender norming” are inherently 
suspect from a combat-effectiveness 
perspective� The problem is that fair 
treatment implies equality, meaning 
that unit members essentially must be 
interchangeable, because “cohesion, the 
ability to stick together and stay together 
even when—particularly when—things 
go disastrously wrong, is the most 
important quality any military forma-
tion must have�” Writes van Creveld, 
“since men and women are not identical, 
treating them as if they were is unfair� 
But treating them as if they were not is 
also unfair, though in a different way�”
The contribution to a climate of 
intellectual dishonesty within the U�S� 
military is a more serious second-order 
effect� Van Creveld suggests that female 
service members actually receive 
preferential treatment, including 
higher promotion rates and more lenient 
treatment during disciplinary proceed-
ings, and in connection with pregnancy� 
What is more dishonest is that “service 
personnel are prohibited from saying 
that such privileges exist,” or, for that 
matter, from writing or commenting 
in any way that might suggest there 
are problems or challenges associated 
with full integration of women into all 
military fields� “The accusation of being 
‘hostile to women’ will follow almost 
automatically,” and being branded as 
such “can easily bring about the end 
of one’s career�” One other form of 
dishonesty concerns charges of sexual 
harassment; as one female U�S� pilot 
told the author, “sexual harassment is 
what I decide to report to my superiors�” 
Whether that is an accurate reflection 
of reality or not, it is widely perceived 
that way among many men in the U�S� 
military� As a result, van Creveld notes 
that “to avoid trouble, men, military 
men more than most, are expected 
to believe—or at least conceal their 
disbelief in—two contradictory things� 
The first is that military women can 
serve and fight just as well as men can 
and that they therefore deserve the kind 
of equality they and their supporters are 
demanding� The second is that, being 
equal, they do not enjoy privileges of 
any kind�” These contradictory ideas are 
“precisely the kind of thing that George 
Orwell in 1984 called ‘double-think�’”
The author concludes this discussion 
with one final point� “Feminizing 
the forces and having women take 
an active part in war and combat 
threatens to take away one of the most 
important reasons, sometimes even 
the most important reason, why many 
men enlist and fight: namely, to prove 
their masculinity to themselves and to 
others�” The “end of masculinity” as 
a desideratum for a military force is 
bound to undermine its “culture of war�”
With regard to “constructing PTSD,” 
historically there is little record of it as a 
widespread phenomenon� Van Creveld 
suggests that this was in part because 
war from ancient times had been 
Printer_Winter2017Review.indb   171 12/15/16   1:53 PM
3
Tol et al.: Book Reviews
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
 1 7 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
associated with notions of aretē (excel-
lence) and virtus (prowess), and more 
recently with “honor” and “pride,” all of 
which helped to forestall or suppress it� 
But over the last century, “what changed 
was the way [war] was perceived and un-
derstood� From a revelatory experience 
akin to a religious one, it was turned 
into a thoroughly rotten business [that] 
was without either virtue or honor or 
knowledge of any sort, merely a process 
whereby obtuse generals sent millions 
to be slaughtered� � � � As a result, almost 
anybody who spent enough time 
fighting was bound to suffer psychologi-
cal damage�” Or so it was claimed�
Western militaries in the world wars 
came to accept notions of “shell shock” 
and “combat fatigue�” What is notable, 
however, is that U�S� forces suffered 
proportionately ten times the rate 
of such psychiatric casualties as did 
the German Wehrmacht, which was 
accepted generally as having displayed 
far greater cohesion and fighting 
power than its Western counterparts 
throughout the second war� Interest-
ingly, postwar East Germany saw far 
lower rates of such conditions than West 
Germany, although both were treating 
the same ex-soldiers� This suggests 
that “there can be no doubt that social 
factors—politics, culture, organization, 
leadership, what have you—do much to 
determine the way PTSD is treated� The 
same seems to apply to its frequency 
and, perhaps, even to its very existence�”
Psychiatric cases spiked in Vietnam 
and PTSD claims remain at high levels� 
Various causes are postulated: concus-
sion; “the sheer terror of modern war”; 
guilt feelings from surviving while 
comrades died; guilt feelings from 
killing others, especially in close combat� 
But as van Creveld demonstrates, many 
of those factors were always present in 
war, yet did not manifest themselves 
in large-scale PTSD� In more-recent 
conflicts, van Creveld notes that there 
was a far lower incidence of PTSD 
among North Vietnamese than among 
U�S� veterans, suggesting that “victory 
is the best cure for the soul�” Nor is 
defeat linked to widespread PTSD, as 
evidenced by the German experience 
in two world wars or, more recently, 
that of Serbs after the Yugoslav wars—a 
Serbian attaché informed the author 
that “PTSD is not a hot topic” in Serbia�
So why is the PTSD rate in the United 
States so high today? “Is it really war that 
is generating PTSD? Or is it present-day 
society’s idée fixe that war is bad both 
in itself and for the soul of those who 
participate in it, so that over enough 
time anybody who does so must break 
down,” in which case there is no disgrace 
involved? Van Creveld suggests that 
the cure may be driving the disease; 
there may be perverse incentives to 
overdiagnose PTSD, with the fear of 
liability at the societal level driving 
the process� There are large numbers 
of claims and claimants, and medical 
specialists, mental health workers, and 
lawyers all have strong incentives to 
keep the process going at full speed� Van 
Creveld poses the difficult question: “Is 
it conceivable that the compensations 
and pensions are providing at least some 
soldiers with an incentive to invent or 
exaggerate symptoms and retain them 
for as long as they can?” He concludes 
by quoting a speech by General Mattis: 
“I would just say there is one mispercep-
tion of our veterans and that is they are 
somehow damaged goods� I don’t buy it� 
If we tell our veterans enough that this 
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is what is wrong with them they may 
actually start believing it� While victim-
hood in America is exalted I don’t think 
our veterans should join those ranks�”
Van Creveld then segues to his fifth 
category, “delegitimizing war,” by noting 
that “to wage war two things are indis-
pensable: armed force and legitimacy�” 
He briefly reviews various notions of 
legitimacy, including war as civic duty in 
ancient times, defense of the sovereign 
power of the state, doctrines such as jus 
ad bellum and jus in bello, war as the 
“school of the nation,” and finally the 
linking of war to Darwinian theories 
regarding natural selection, survival of 
the fittest, and nations’ “will to live�”
The rise of powerful antimilitarist 
feelings after the world wars deeply 
eroded the idea of duty to the nation, 
even while “the language of rights now 
dominates political debate in the United 
States�” The post-Vietnam shift to an 
all-volunteer force further diminished 
the sense of individual obligation to the 
whole, while military service often came 
to be seen as being only for those with 
no better prospects� Van Creveld notes 
darkly that “where rights reign supreme 
and duty has become an object of ne-
glect, suspicion, and even derision—as it 
has in most Western societies—whether, 
if and when the test comes, they will 
be sufficient is anybody’s guess�”
The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions 
initiated the idea that there were, 
or should be, better ways to settle 
international disputes than by war� 
This trend was reinforced strongly after 
the ruinous world wars by numerous 
subsequent conventions and treaties 
and the establishment of the United 
Nations� In parallel, concepts of “war 
guilt” and rejections of the national use 
of force except strictly in self-defense 
supplanted older notions of “the right of 
conquest” and have tended increasingly 
to delegitimize war, at least in the West� 
Thus, for many Western thinkers, the 
search for a replacement for war ought 
to favor nonmilitary alternatives, such 
as police training teams, mediators, and 
“dialogs�” In van Creveld’s view, “both 
intellectuals and politicians keep prom-
ising their audiences security without 
sacrifice, privilege without responsibil-
ity� But what if terrorists/guerrillas/
insurgents/freedom fighters refuse to 
answer empathy with empathy?”
In van Creveld’s view, these five trends 
collectively have deeply undermined 
Western military effectiveness and 
societal resilience, aggravated by the 
inability or unwillingness to examine 
the underlying causal factors rigorously 
and honestly� He closes by asserting 
that the bedrock cause is that “large 
parts of both European and American 
societies, each in its own way, have come 
to see war not simply as an evil that is 
sometimes made absolutely necessary 
by circumstances but as the ultimate 
one that almost nothing can justify� 
This will have to change� Or else�”
Many readers will reject various of the 
author’s arguments as anachronistic 
or, in any event, “overcome by events,” 
hence not of interest or worthy of fur-
ther debate or assessment� However, that 
at least some of them represent signifi-
cant threats to contemporary policies or 
agendas is suggested by the ruthless de 
facto suppression of vigorous debate on 
sensitive topics by senior officers and top 
civilian leaders (which invariably leads 
to self-censorship, particularly among 
ambitious officers)� Such intimidation is 
pure intellectual thuggery, which in itself 
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is a great institutional danger, especially 
in the military profession, where free 
thinking, combined with robust debate, 
is the essential prerequisite for not being 
out thought and outfought by future foes�
Almost as dangerous as intellectual 
thuggery is willful ignorance of “un-
pleasant truths” or empirical evidence� 
This was illustrated most notoriously 
by Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus’s 
recent a priori policy decision, made 
in the fashion of Alice in Wonderland’s 
Red Queen (“Sentence first, verdict 
afterwards!”), to open all ground combat 
positions to women regardless of any 
data that might result subsequently 
from the Marine Corps’s rigorous 
yearlong study regarding the perfor-
mance of mixed-gender units� That 
sort of thing corrosively undermines 
the institutional trust essential to the 
success of any military organization�
Pussycats doubtless is controversial� 
However, van Creveld’s arguments are 
coherent and intellectually substantive, 
even if one may disagree with some of 
the assumptions he makes to support 
them� Because they explicitly address 
the most fundamental criterion for 
assessing military forces—their combat 
effectiveness—they are very worth 
pondering by serving military officers 
and civilian policy makers, especially 
those more senior� Certainly the ques-
tion of why Western military might, in 
conjunction with the other elements 
of state power, has not been more 
effective during the past half-century 
is a crucial one, given the multiple 
dangerous challenges the West confronts 
both today and over the longer term�
JAN VAN TOL
Assessing China’s Naval Power: Technological In-
novation, Economic Constraints, and Strategic Im-
plications, by Sarah Kirchberger� Berlin: Springer-
Verlag, 2015� 318 pages� $129�
Few recent works on the Chinese navy 
have arrived with a more intrigu-
ing pedigree than this volume� It is 
unusual to find any in-depth work on 
the Chinese military being done by 
European researchers� Assessing China’s 
Naval Power, the product of a German 
academic and released by a respected 
European publisher, is essentially unique 
in the field� Further, the author comes 
at the problem with a diverse résumé, 
having applied her academic training 
in East Asian politics as an analyst with 
the German shipbuilder Blohm + Voss� 
Despite these selling points, the work 
fails to deliver an original or compelling 
view of the fast-changing Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)�
Dr� Kirchberger sets out to create 
an objective and largely materialist 
yardstick by which to measure Chinese 
naval development� While dealing 
briefly with issues of policy and strategy, 
she notes that matériel “defines the up-
per limit of what is achievable through 
naval strategy�” As she seeks objective 
comparisons, Kirchberger uses other 
Asian and the so-called BRIC (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China) navies as the 
benchmark for “normal” naval develop-
ment� While interesting, this effort to 
quantify the analysis results in a strained 
attempt to extract meaning from what 
is quantifiable from available sources�
As an example, in one vignette Kirch-
berger compares Asian naval forces 
with the total areas of the exclusive 
economic zones (EEZs) their nations 
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claim� The result suggests that China has 
an average level of patrol-capable vessels, 
but that the PLAN submarine force, at 
one submarine per 35,716�75 square 
kilometers of EEZ, is comparatively 
large� It is tempting to critique such an 
approach on the details: the figure used 
for China’s EEZ is smaller than the scope 
of its expansive maritime claims; and 
administration of maritime claims in 
China is a function of its rapidly growing 
coast guard and maritime militia (not 
explicitly included), whereas for many 
of the other nations analyzed the navy 
performs law-enforcement functions� 
More significant is the irrelevance of the 
figures themselves� By that yardstick, 
the U�S� Navy (not included in this 
analysis) defends one of the world’s 
largest EEZs with a paltry one subma-
rine per 210,000 square kilometers of 
EEZ� Navies are developed for strategic 
purposes, which vary from case to case�
Additionally, the focus on comparing 
the PLAN with developing nations’ 
navies ignores the fact that one of the 
driving combat tasks for the PLAN 
is countering USN presence in Asia� 
Taking the U�S� Navy as a yardstick for 
Chinese naval development matters 
because it is the yardstick the Chinese 
themselves have set� That does not mean 
the PLAN needs or desires to emulate 
USN force structure in detail, but 
considering both sides of a two-sided 
interaction is critical to understanding�
More interesting is Kirchberger’s analysis 
of China’s shipbuilding capabilities� 
Drawing on her experience in the 
shipbuilding industry, Kirchberger 
assesses that the Chinese civil shipbuild-
ing industry, though massive, offers few 
advantages in the production of naval 
combatants� In the critical maritime 
electronic sector, the book argues 
that the European arms embargo and 
centralized Chinese state control have 
stymied most meaningful innovation� 
Chinese combatants are presented as 
collections of imported and copied 
systems, with the assumption that the 
systems-integration problems such a 
model implies significantly hamper 
their combat performance� The Chinese 
decision to purchase the Russian-made 
Sovremenny-class destroyer and 
Kilo-class submarine in the middle of 
the previous decade is seen as a tacit 
admission of systemic deficiencies in 
Chinese maritime systems develop-
ment� However, Kirchberger arguably 
underestimates China’s success at both 
systems integration and adaptation 
of foreign technologies� For example, 
China received limited numbers of 
Russian-manufactured MINERAL 
ME radars and reverse engineered 
them with enough success that they 
now are deployed on every Jiangkai 
II frigate produced� Kirchberger 
dismisses these systems as poor copies�
While an earnest effort, at its heart this 
volume fails on its sources� Dependent 
on other secondary, primarily English-
language, works, it contains few if any 
references to Chinese-language sources� 
As the volume was published in 2015, 
most of these sources are from 2013 
and prior� For example, Kirchberger’s 
most consequential conclusions about 
the PLAN submarine force hinge on a 
2007 analysis of PLAN patrol activity 
during the prior decade� The result 
is a view of the Chinese navy that 
arguably is accurate as of about 2010, 
but that does not account for the rapid 
changes in the scope and complexity 
of PLAN platforms, capabilities, and 
operations in the intervening years�
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Given the relatively small number of 
academics doing serious analysis of the 
PLAN, the introduction of a new point 
of view is always to be welcomed. In 
this case, however, naval professionals 
interested in Chinese naval development 
would be served better by going directly 
to the sources behind this volume.
DALE C. RIELAGE
Deng Xiaoping’s Long War: The Military Con-
flict between China and Vietnam, 1979–1991, by 
Xiaoming Zhang. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North 
Carolina Press, 2015. 296 pages. $34.95 (e-book 
$33.99).
This book will be welcomed equally 
by historians, political scientists, and 
international relations specialists. It is 
a worthy addition to existing literature 
and belongs on any bookshelf dedicated 
to understanding modern China and 
Southeast Asia. Xiaoming Zhang, an 
associate professor in the Department 
of Strategy at the Air War College, has 
provided valuable additional informa-
tion and analysis concerning the People’s 
Republic of China’s invasion of Vietnam 
in 1979. The Chinese invasion was 
planned deliberately and analytically, 
then for nearly a month the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) fought fiercely 
against China’s neighbor and former 
ally. At the end of this period, the two 
countries settled into a continuing active 
and deadly border dispute that lasted 
a decade. Taking advantage of recently 
declassified Chinese documents and an 
impressive number of interviews, Dr. 
Zhang has advanced significantly our 
understanding of why the Chinese chose 
to initiate the somewhat Orwellian-
sounding “counterattack in self-defense 
against Vietnam,” how the war was 
conducted, and why the subsequent 
conflict along the Vietnamese-
Chinese border lasted so long.
As the history of the conflict unfolds, 
Deng Xiaoping becomes more and 
more the central figure and key Chinese 
decision maker. By the conclusion of the 
book, Dr. Zhang presents a convincing 
case that the war of 1979 was indeed 
Deng’s war—a war into which he entered 
as much to preserve and promote his 
plans for economic modernization as to 
affect the balance of power in the inter-
national political system, while simulta-
neously aiming to rehabilitate and start 
the process of modernizing the PLA.
The book explains how the recent North 
Vietnamese victory over the Americans 
and the South Vietnamese had a surpris-
ingly deleterious effect on Vietnam’s 
previously amiable and long-term alli-
ance with China. Flushed with victory 
and boasting a hardened and well-
equipped army, the Vietnamese became, 
to Chinese eyes, increasingly arrogant 
and unfriendly. Vietnam’s invasion of 
Cambodia and its deepening friendship 
with the Soviet Union led Deng to see 
China’s position as potentially imperiled, 
threatened by the USSR to the north 
and the Vietnamese to the south. In 
particular, the invasion of Cambodia 
in December 1978 was viewed as proof 
of Hanoi’s ambition to make Vietnam a 
hegemonic power in Southeast Asia, and 
added significantly to Deng’s concerns.
Deng, who already had determined that 
economic and industrial modernization 
was the way ahead for China, arrived 
at an apparently counterintuitive 
conclusion. Significant combat opera-
tions conducted against Vietnam, the 
Soviet Union’s most important regional 
ally, would signal to the United States 
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and other Western powers that China 
was a reliable partner that could be 
counted on to do what was needed� 
In return, the West would be more 
likely to continue to support Chinese 
efforts to modernize, and the perceived 
Soviet threat would be reduced�
However, as Zhang explains, the 
Chinese army had not fought a major 
war in three decades� Its tactics were 
outdated and its logistics support was 
inferior, and no officer below the rank 
of battalion commander was battle 
tested� Furthermore, the PLA did not 
enjoy a positive reputation within 
China’s general population� In contrast, 
the Vietnamese army had decades of 
recent combat experience, large stores 
of modern Soviet and captured U�S� 
military equipment, and the intangible 
benefits that come with victory�
A massive propaganda campaign to 
improve the image of the PLA was 
launched� Significant amounts of 
military stores were moved into the 
Guangzhou and Kunming military 
districts� Army planners prepared for 
a massive offensive designed to seize 
several major northern Vietnamese cit-
ies and wreck two Vietnamese divisions 
in the process� The whole campaign was 
designed to “teach Vietnam a lesson�”
Zhang provides a detailed account of 
the fighting that followed� The Chinese 
executed their plan successfully, albeit 
at a much higher cost than anticipated� 
Zhang debunks common claims by 
Vietnamese that the majority of their 
combatants were local militia fight-
ers� While it is true that several elite 
Vietnamese divisions were engaged in 
Cambodia, far more regular army units 
fought in the north than the Vietnamese 
indicated� The war was almost exclu-
sively a ground war, although both the 
Vietnamese and Chinese air forces car-
ried out many reconnaissance missions�
After nearly thirty days of fairly hard 
fighting, Chinese forces withdrew to the 
border, having achieved their geographic 
objectives and inflicted significant ca-
sualties on enemy forces� The operation 
had been calibrated skillfully to “punish” 
Vietnam, without going so far as to bring 
the Soviets into the fray� Deng then 
directed the army to continue to fight 
along the border until the Vietnamese 
withdrew from Cambodia� It would take 
a decade—and the visible decline of the  
Soviet Union—but in the end 
Vietnamese leaders acquiesced and 
Deng got what he wanted� During this 
period Vietnam’s economy suffered� 
China’s southernmost provinces 
also suffered, but the nation reaped 
the benefits of modernization 
and Western engagement�
Chinese military leaders deliberately 
used the ensuing chronic border conflict 
to “blood” much of their army and 
local militias� The war also provided 
new heroes to place in the public eye� 
However, in one of the more poignant 
portions of the book, Zhang describes 
how China’s Vietnam experience 
affected many of the participants in 
much the same manner as it had their 
earlier U�S� equivalents� Strategically, the 
war also saw the Chinese army embrace 
combined operations and a turn to mod-
ernization as a requirement for victory�
Zhang makes a convincing argument 
that Deng Xiaoping calculatingly 
used the Chinese military instrument 
to achieve strategic, domestic, and 
personal goals� His war was one of 
deliberate choice� Potential Vietnamese 
hegemonic ambitions were thwarted; 
Vietnam would be forced to leave 
Cambodia� China’s ties to the West 
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were strengthened; Soviet influence 
in the region was weakened�
China reaped other benefits, although 
some were perhaps mixed� Vietnam 
would—and still does—view China 
with suspicion� Other countries in 
the region now know that China did, 
and could once again, wage offensive 
war, if seen to be in the interest of the 
state� The Chinese military, once so 
abysmally behind technologically, has 
transformed itself� Combined arms 
operations, performed haltingly at 
best in 1979, are now common�
Zhang frequently and conscientiously  
reminds the reader that, although 
knowledge of the Sino-Vietnamese 
conflict has increased greatly, it is  
important not to embrace any conclu-
sions, even the most apparently 
convincing, as definitive� This is because 
some Chinese and all the Vietnamese 
records have yet to be declassified� The 
warning is appropriate, but should 
not detract from Zhang’s analysis, nor 
from a deep appreciation of his work�
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